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Abstract 
 
 
 
The Mirror Neuron System (MNS) has been argued to be a key brain system responsible for 
action understanding and imitation. Subsequently, MNS dysfunction has therefore been 
proposed to explain the social deficits manifested within Autism Spectrum Condition (ASC), 
an approach referred to as the Broken Mirror Hypothesis (BMH). Despite excitement 
surrounding this hypothesis, extensive research has produced insufficient evidence to support 
the BMH in its pure form and instead two alternative models have been formulated: EP-M 
model and the Social Top-down Response Modulation (STORM) model. All models suggest 
some dysfunction regarding the MNS in ASC, be that within the MNS itself or systems that 
regulate the MNS. This literature review compares these three models in regard to recent 
neuroscientific investigations. This review concludes that there is insufficient support for the 
BMH, but converging evidence supports an integrated EP-M and STORM model. 
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Continuing to look in the mirror: A review of neurological evidence for the Broken 
Mirror Hypothesis, EP-M model and STORM model of Autism Spectrum Conditions 
 
 
The discovery of mirror neurons, in macaque monkeys, was considered by some to be a 
major breakthrough into unravelling the neural basis of action understanding, imitation and 
also Autism Spectrum Conditions (hereafter ASC/autism) (di Pellegrino et al., 1992). The 
Mirror Neuron System (MNS), comprising mainly of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and 
inferior parietal lobe (IPL), responds when actions are performed (e.g. grasping a cup to 
drink) and when the same action is observed (seeing another person grasp a cup). This 
visual-motor property links self-generated actions with the actions of others, theoretically 
allowing an individual to understand observed actions in terms of their own movements 
(Buccino et al., 2004). Since action understanding has been argued to be impaired in ASC 
(Vivanti et al. 2011; Cattaneo et al. 2007; Boria et al. 2009; Rizzolatti et al., 2009, though see 
Hamilton, Brindley, & Frith, 2007), an MNS dysfunction was suggested to explain the 
condition; this is essentially the Broken Mirror Hypothesis (BMH) (Ramachandran & 
Oberman, 2006). 
 
However, the function and even the very existence of the human MNS remains 
controversial. There have been methodological issues in MNS-related research, including 
the use of unsatisfactory controls and confounding variables, such as the effect of attention 
on specific electroencephalographic responses (Hobson & Bishop, 2016, 2017b), as well as 
the notion that data is predominantly correlational rather than causational. Counter-
arguments have also highlighted that data from primates cannot be used to explain abilities 
that primates themselves lack, such as language (see Hickok, 2009). Indeed, human and 
animal studies have discrepant methodologies; while studies on macaques have been able 
to use single-cell recordings to demonstrate the response patterns of cells in the 
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sensorimotor cortex, such a technique is rarely able to be applied in research studies of the 
human MNS, which has had to rely on more indirect measures of the MNS, including 
fMRI and EEG. Importantly for the present review, some studies have also failed to 
replicate any MNS abnormalities in ASC (Fan et al., 2010; Mathewson et al., 2012). To 
reconcile the inconsistencies within the literature, Hamilton conducted two reviews into the 
BMH (Hamilton, 2008, 2013). Both reviews concluded that there is a lack of evidence for 
the BMH and instead proposed two alternate models: the EP-M model (Hamilton, 2008) 
and the Social Top-down Response Modulation Model (STORM) (Wang & Hamilton, 
2012; Hamilton, 2013). All three models are summarised in Figure 1. 
 
 
The EP-M Model and Social Top-down Response Modulation Model 
 
A main tenet of the EP-M model (Figure 1B) is that the pattern of behavioural 
difficulties and strengths in autism, particularly in regard to imitation abilities, does not 
support a global difficulty in the MNS. Instead, imitation behaviour is served by two routes 
of three nodes, the IFG, the IPL and the middle temporal gyrus (MTG), and three pathways 
between them. Processing of all actions begins in the MTG, which extracts the visual 
kinematic features (e.g. the motion of a hand) of an observed action. The remaining route is 
then based on whether the action is goal-directed, or not. For goal-directed actions, 
information is then sent from the MTG via the emulation pathway (E-route) to the IPL. The 
,3/WKHQSURFHVVHVWKHDFWLRQ¶VDEVWUDFWJRDOHJJUDVSLQJDFXSWRGULQN7KLVJRDO
information is then passed on to the IFG, via the planning (P) pathway, where the motor 
features for action execution are formulated. If the action to be imitated is not goal-directed, 
this is served by the mimicry route (M-route), a direct route between the MTG and IFG, 
which provides a direct connection between the visual features of observed actions and 
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motor representations. This allows for automatic imitation of observed action sequences. It is 
this mimicry route which is claimed to be impaired in ASC, according to the EP-M model.  
The STORM model (Figure 1D) proposes that ASC symptoms stem from 
abnormalities within the top-down regulation of the MNS, rather than within the MNS itself. 
In NT (neurotypical) individuals, the MNS processes the visual-motor properties of 
executed/observed actions, while the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) imposes the social 
significance of those actions onto the MNS. For example, observing someone raising their 
arm will be processed differently depending on whether they are in a lecture or at a 
supermarket. This top-down modulation is argued to be reduced in ASC, resulting in an 
impaired ability to utilise the social relevance of observed actions but a regular ability to 
imitate actions (via visual-motor integration). 
 
These models are not mutually exclusive: Hamilton (2008) suggested that the M-route 
dysfunction proposed in the EP-M model could stem from atypicalities in top-down 
modulation. However, both models contrast with the BMH which claims that a global deficit 
in the MNS explains ASC symptomology. 
 
Aims of the current review 
 
Given continued neuroscientific research into the MNS in ASC, a review and 
comparison of these two models is timely. The present literature review aims to critically 
DVVHVVVWXGLHVSXEOLVKHGVLQFH+DPLOWRQ¶VUHYLHZVWRFDSWXUHWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKHDFKPRGHO
is supported by recent neuroscientific findings. Behavioural evidence (i.e. imitation deficits 
in autism) has been reviewed elsewhere, demonstrating robust deficits in imitation in autistic 
individuals (Edwards, 2014). Interestingly, this deficit was argued to be specific to tasks 
which required participants to reproduce the precise movements of the action to achieve a 
goal, and ASC participants showed no difference to NT participants when they could use 
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their own method of execution to imitate the goal of a task (emulation). Such a review is in 
keeping with the EP-M model. 
However, all three models ± the BMH, EP-M and STORM ± are inherently 
neuroscientific models that make claims regarding the role of specific brain networks and 
regions. Therefore, our review shall focus on neuroscientific methodologies (i.e. methods 
of inquiry that draw upon measures of brain activity or structure), to complement reviews 
RIEHKDYLRXUDOZRUN:LWKLQWKLVGHILQLWLRQRI³QHXURVFLHQWLILF´DOVRIDOOVQHXURIHHGEDFN
training and post-PRUWHPGDWDQHLWKHURIZKLFKZHUHLQFOXGHGLQ+DPLOWRQ¶VUHYLHZV. 
 
 
Predictions from respective theories 
 
Each model yields specific predictions for neuroscientific data. If the BMH is valid, 
then participants with ASC should show a global deficit in the MNS, leading to a 
disadvantage in tasks reliant upon this system: as long as the task utilises mirroring 
mechanisms, there should be a significant difference between ASC participants and NT 
participants on measures of mirror neuron activity. Whether this difference is hyperactivity 
or hypoactivity in relation to NT controls is not specified, and both have been argued to 
support the theory (Dapretto et al., 2006; Williams et al., 2006; Martineau et al., 2010). 
 
The EP-M model would predict that ASC individuals are only disadvantaged on 
tasks in which participants process non-goal directed actions, as these depend on the M-
route. Tasks in which stimuli have an end goal, and therefore utilise the EP pathway, 
should produce no significant differences between ASC and NT participants on measures 
of mirror neuron activity. 
 
In contrast to both of the preceding models, the STORM model would predict that 
differences between NT and ASC groups are not due to deficits within the MNS itself but 
within its connections to and regulation by frontal regions of the brain. This would suggest 
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that under circumstances that did not require top-down regulation of the MNS, ASC and 
NT participants should appear the same. However, ASC individuals would be 
disadvantaged if the task had social relevance, or relied upon the executive control of the 
MNS. 
 
 
Method 
 
A literature search, incorporating Ovid, Web of Science and Google Scholar was 
FRQGXFWHGXVLQJWKHIROORZLQJVHDUFKSKDVHVµ$XWLVP¶25µ$6'¶25µ$6&¶25µ$XWLVWLF¶
$1'µ0LUURUQHXURQV\VWHP¶25µ016¶25µ%URNHQ0LUURU+\SRWKHVLV¶,QLWLDONH\ZRUG
searches produced 7088 papers (Ovid=184, Google scholar= 38, Web of science= 6866). 
Papers were selected based on the following criteria: 1) they must refer to both ASC and the 
MNS; 2) they must focus on the MNS rather than the whole action imitation network; 3) 
WKH\PXVWQRWKDYHEHHQLQFRUSRUDWHGLQ+DPLOWRQ¶VRUUHYLHZWKH\PXVWQRW
be a systematic review; 5) they must use quantitative neurological measures rather than 
behavioural or qualitative measures. Screening abstracts, titles and methods sections in 
reference to this inclusion criteria revealed 17 papers of relevance. Papers on neuro-feedback 
WUDLQLQJSXEOLVKHGSULRUWR+DPLOWRQ¶VUHYLHZVZHUHLQFOXGHGDVWKHVHVWXGLHVZHUHQRW
incorporated in these previous reviews. These 17 papers, dated from 2012-2018, are briefly 
summarised in Table 1. 
 
 
Results 
 
Evidence from Electroencephalography (EEG) Studies 
 
In EEG studies of the MNS, a common index of MNS activity is mu suppression, a 
characteristic reduction in alpha activity (8-13Hz) from electrodes over the sensorimotor 
strip (i.e. typically sensors C1, Cz, C3) during action observation or execution (Braadbaart et 
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al., 2013). If indeed autistic participants have a dysfunctional MNS, as proposed by the 
BMH, ASC participants should show a lack of mu suppression, or reduced mu suppression 
compared to controls during action observation. In comparison, the EP-M model would 
suggest that this lack of mu suppression should only be seen for conditions in which action 
stimuli or tasks lack a specific goal. The STORM model would only predict less mu 
suppression in ASC participants if input from regions such as the PFC was required to 
complete the task, (i.e. to compute the social relevance of a situation within the task). 
 
Comparing data from six studies, Hamilton (2013) found no clear evidence to support 
the BMH and advocated for the STORM model. For the current review, five additional 
studies meeting the search criteria were found which compared mu suppression in ASC and 
NT groups. In each study, EEG recordings were extracted while the participant watched a 
video or a live demonstration of a biological action (e.g. a stranger opening and closing their 
hand, watching the experimenter place a toy in a box). Baseline conditions included either a 
rest condition or watching a non-biological action (i.e. a ball moving). Some researchers 
have proposed utilizing the mu rhythm as a target for neurofeedback therapy: these studies 
are discussed in a subsequent section. 
 
Oberman et al. (2012) attempted to investigate differences in developmental changes 
in the MNS in NT versus ASC groups, by pooling data from four previous mu suppression 
studies and examining the correlation between mu suppression and age. Age was associated 
with mu suppression, with stronger mu suppression to observing action stimuli with 
increasing age. The correlations did not differ between the ASC and NT groups, suggesting 
that the MNS develops along a similar trajectory in ASC and NT children. This pooled 
analysis did show a significant difference between NT and ASC groups in their mean mu 
suppression when observing action stimuli, which would support the BMH. However, 
arguably the EP-M model is also supported as the action observation condition for three out 
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of the IRXUVWXGLHV¶GDWDZDVH[FOXVLYHO\IURPFRQGLWLRQVWKDWZHUHDFWLRQVZLWKRXWREMHFWVRU
goals (opening and closing a hand). These are actions that would be theoretically reliant on 
the M-pathway. The fourth dataset would have included both object-based and non-objected 
based actions, and contributed only 8/66 ASC datasets. The results would thus be in-keeping 
with a dysfunction in the M-pathway. 
 
Ruysschaert et al. (2014) investigated mu suppression in young children, using goal-
based and non-goal-based stimuli: they report no significant group effects, nor any group 
by condition interactions. Thus, no deficits in mu suppression were seen for either kind of 
action. These results fit neither with the BMH nor the EP-M, but could be interpreted 
according to the STORM framework, which would predict abnormalities in the MNS only 
under task conditions which demand social top-down regulation. 
 
Bernier et al. (2013) investigated the association between mu suppression and 
behavioural imitation abilities, in children with ASC and NT controls. In addition to the EEG 
procedure, in which participants observed and executed the action of grasping a wooden 
block, each child also completed a behavioural imitation task, which included tests of manual 
and facial imitation abilities. ASC and NT participants showed comparable mu suppression 
and imitative ability. These results are problematic for the BMH, although Bernier et al. 
(2013) noted that there was a sub-group of participants who demonstrated a lack of mu 
suppression and also poor imitation, derived from both the ASC and NT samples; the authors 
suggest that behaviours such as imitation, rather than autism per se, may be associated with 
MNS atypicalities. Mu suppression correlated with facial imitation abilities only. Arguably, 
IDFLDOLPLWDWLRQPD\KDYHDJUHDWHUUHOLDQFHRQ016V\VWHPVJLYHQWKDWRQH¶VRZQIDFH
FDQQRWEHVHHQDVRSSRVHGWRRQH¶VKDQGVDQGWKXVDFWLRQ-observation matching 
mechanisms may be a more central process for this type of imitation. Facial imitation was 
also noted in Hamilton (2008) as being particularly reliant on the M-route, and thus these 
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results also support the EP-M model. Furthermore, the EEG action observation condition 
involved actions where a hand grasped an object, an action that would be served the EP 
route. As this route is intact in ASC according to Hamilton (2008), the lack of group 
differences support the EP-M model. Finally, given there was no social top-down regulation 
UHTXLUHGLQWKLVVWXG\¶VSURFHGXUHWKHODFNRI group differences in mu suppression is also in 
keeping with the STORM model. 
 
So far, the discussed investigations have focused on the 8-13Hz rhythm as a single 
band width and focused dominantly on the central electrodes (positioned above the 
sensorimotor strip). Dumas et al. (2014) extended their EEG analysis to the whole scalp and 
split the mu frequency band into two sub-bands. Participants observed videos of meaningless 
hand gestures, imitated these hand gestures, and produced their own. It was demonstrated 
that, when observing hand actions, adults with ASC show reduced mu suppression in the 
upper sub-band (10-12/13Hz), yet demonstrated no differences to NT participants in the 
lower sub-band (8-10Hz). These sub-bands have been attributed to different brain areas; the 
lower band has been attributed to the MNS, while the upper band may arise from executive 
control areas (Frenkel-Toledo et al. 2014). Therefore, these results are supportive of 
differences in top-down modulation. Furthermore, mu suppression differences arose in 
parietal-occipital regions (caudal to the regions typically implicated in mu suppression 
studies that only consider electrode sites over the sensorimotor strip) and frontal regions of 
the brain, rather than the sensorimotor regions. This suggests that differences between groups 
lie outside the typical MNS regions. 
 
Finally, Cole et al. (2018) utilised both EEG and TMS measures of the MNS in their 
investigation (TMS findings are considered in the section below). Their conditions included a 
mentalizing task (stating whether an actor was spiteful or clumsy when failing to post a poker 
chip through a slot) and a non-mentalizing task (stating whether an actor was successful or 
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unsuccessful at posting a poker chip through a slot). They also took to the approach of 
Dumas et al (2014), splitting their analyses into upper and lower mu bands. There were no 
group effects on the upper mu bands. For the lower mu band, there were significant 
differences between ASC participants and NT participants in right hemisphere mu 
suppression for the mentalizing task, though differences were borderline. Autistic traits (as 
measured by the Autism Spectrum Quotient [AQ]) predicted right hemisphere mu 
suppression during the mentalizing task. Left hemisphere mu suppression differed between 
groups only during the non-mentalizing control task, and this difference was between two 
control groups (high versus low AQ), rather than between ASC and NT groups. Left 
hemispheric mu suppression during the mentalizing condition predicted performance on the 
mentalizing task. These findings are difficult to fit neatly with the BMH, which would 
predict group differences in mu suppression during both tasks, as reduced mu suppression 
during the mere viewing of actions has been considered supportive of the BMH in the studies 
described above (see Oberman et al., 2012). The BMH would also predict correlations 
between mu suppression, AQ scores and mentalizing ability, given the characteristics of 
autism are argued to stem from atypicalities in the MNS. The stimuli for this experiment 
required the processing of goal-oriented actions, processing which the EP-M model argues is 
not abnormal in ASC: the minimal group differences could be explained this way. 
Alternatively, the group difference in mu suppression in the non-mentalizing task could be 
explained by the STORM model, which argues that modulation of MNS activation is what is 
impaired in ASC; potentially top-down modulation failed to reduce MNS activity for the 
ASC group during this condition. However, this should lead to a lack of a task effect for the 
ASC group only, which is not reported by Cole et al. (in fact across all participants there 
were no significant task effects, once only stimuli shown in both mentalizing and non-
mentalizing condition were considered). Therefore, Cole et al.'s findings do not neatly fit 
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with any of the three models, though the study concludes that ASC is associated with reduced 
right hemisphere MNS activity during mentalizing. 
Taken together, these EEG studies refute the BMH, as predicted differences in mu 
suppression were either not reported or are better explained under the alternative models, 
particularly the EP-M model. More recent studies that have examined mu suppression band 
differences at other sites and using other sub-bands have also produced findings fitting the 
STORM model. However, this model struggles to explain some of the findings brought 
about by studies using mentalizing tasks: tasks in which we would expect social cues to 
modulate MNS activity. 
 
 
 
 
 
Evidence from Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation 
 
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) approaches to MNS research have typically 
utilised motor evoked potentials (MEPs). MEPs, movements stimulated by TMS over the 
motor cortex (e.g. arm flinches), are more pronounced during action observation, compared 
to a baseline condition. This has been suggested to represent pre-activation in the motor 
cortex during action observation; therefore, it is argued that differences in MEPs during 
action observation could provide a measure of the activity of the human MNS (Fadiga et al., 
1995). Under the BMH, we would expect ASC participants to show no differences, or a 
reduced difference, in MEP responses during action observation versus a baseline condition, 
compared to controls. The EP-M hypothesis would suggest this effect would depend on 
whether stimuli were goal or non-goal based. STORM would predict effects would be 
dependent upon top-down modulation requirements. Compared to other methods, Hamilton 
(2013) found TMS to provide the most consistent results, in which ASC participants 
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showed a lack of task modulation of MEPs when observing hand actions (Hamilton, 2013), 
a finding in keeping with the BMH. 
 
Similar to Hamilton (2013), two studies that met the inclusion criteria were found to 
have collected TMS data: Enticott et al. (2013) and Cole et al. (2018). Cole et al. utilised 
the same paradigm as used in the EEG portion of their study (see above), whereas Enticott 
et al. asked participants to view videos of various hand actions: static hands, single hand 
actions or hands actions from two individuals interacting with one another. 
 
No differences in MEPs were reported between ASC and NT participants in either 
investigation. This is intriguing as Cole et al. (2018) found significant group differences in 
MNS activity when using EEG (see above), despite incorporating the same participants. The 
conflicting reports between EEG and TMS measures suggests that these techniques may 
reflect activity from two different areas or cognitive processes. Indeed, it maybe that TMS-
based MEPs reflect processes arising from the primary motor cortex, while EEG-derived mu 
suppression originates from the somatosensory cortex (Fadiga, et al., 2005; Cheyne et al., 
2003). Both areas have been shown to have mirror properties (Confalonieri et al., 2012), 
however recent work with NT participants has suggested that the EEG measure of mu 
suppression mirrors the sensory aspects of an action, but not its motor components (Coll, 
Press, Hobson, Catmur, & Bird, 2017; Coll et al., 2015). Since group differences were only 
shown from EEG, these findings may suggest that purely the sensory aspects of the MNS 
are affected in ASC rather than the motor characteristics of the network. 
 
Since Cole et al.¶VVWLPXOLZHUHREMHFW-based and goal-directed (pushing a poker chip 
through a slot), the EP-M model would predict no MEP differences between ASC and NT 
SDUWLFLSDQWVVLQFHWKHVHDFWLRQVXWLOLVHWKH(3URXWH(QWLFRWWHWDO¶VVWLPXOL
involved interactive two-person hand actions; it is not clear whether such stimuli would be 
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supported by the M or EP routes, but arguably one could conceive of these actions as 
having a goal. If so, a lack of group differences would be in keeping with the EP-M model. 
 
The STORM model would predict that MEPs would be unaffected when viewing hand 
actions, as neither study was presented the task within a social context. However, deciding 
whether an actor is spiteful or clumsy could be argued to require social cues and therefore, ASC 
participants in Cole et al. (2018) study would be expected to show a lack of MEP 
modulation. The null effects are therefore contrary to STORM. 
 
 
 
 
 
Evidence from Magnetic Resonance Imaging and Diffusion Tensor Imaging studies 
 
The brain regions typically considered to form the MNS usually include IFG and IPL. 
Magnetic Resonance Imagining (MRI) techniques allow for activity in these purported mirror 
neuron regions to be compared between ASC and NT groups. The BMH would predict 
global activity differences with the MNS, whereas the EP-M model would predict that 
differences lie within middle temporal regions, regions that support the M-route, and that 
activity differences would be specific to stimuli without objects. The STORM model predicts 
that differences in MNS activity, if any, are due to reduced top-down regulation. Therefore, 
differences in PFC activity should be present, and during tasks that require social 
modulation. In addition to differences in the activation of brain regions, DTI techniques 
allow for differences in the connectivity between regions belonging to the MNS to be 
investigated. Global connectivity differences would be in line with the BMH, whereas the 
EP-M model would theories that connectivity differences are specific to the M-pathway. 
Differences within top down connections to the MNS would support the STORM account. 
Hamilton (2008, 2013) reported mixed evidence for the BMH in both reviews when 
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reviewing the MRI literature. We identified 3 functional MRI (fMRI) studies, and 3 
Diffusion Tensor Imaging studies. 
 
Recent work using fMRI has reported significant differences in activity from MNS 
brain areas between NT and ASC groups (Wadsworth et al., 2018; Libero et al., 2014). 
Both studies incorporated a mentalizing task incorporating images of hands (see Table 1 for 
details). Higher MNS activity (in the IFG) was reported for the ASC participants in both 
studies. These results complement a recent meta-analysis of fMRI research, which noted 
hyperactivity in the IFG of ASC participants, when viewing different actions (Yang & 
Hofmann, 2016). Clearly this direction is not the one typically predicted by the BMH: one 
could perhaps suggest that ASC participants have an inefficient MNS, which must work 
harder to equal the mentalizing ability of NT individuals, but this post-hoc explanation 
remains speculative (Libero et al. themselves suggest that their data show a relatively intact 
response of the MNS in ASC). Even so, hyperactivity localised within frontal and temporal 
areas would imply that inefficiencies reside within the M-pathway, supporting EP-M 
predictions, or within top-down connections to the MNS, in line with STORM predictions. 
Furthermore, in Wadsworth et al. (2018) the group differences in activity were only seen in 
conditions where participants viewed actions which lacked the use of an object. This could 
imply a specific abnormality in the M-pathway. 
 
Reduced functional connectivity between the IFG and the MTG (i.e. the M-route) has 
been reported (Libero et al., 2014), up-holding EP-M predictions. However, the direction of 
these findings are inconsistent, and some have suggested that connectivity differences are not 
seen throughout the spectrum: Fishman et al. (2014) reported that the ASC participants with 
the greatest autistic symptoms demonstrated enhanced functional connectivity within the 
MNS (rather than reduced connectivity, as reported by Libero et al., 2014), and average 
connectivity within the MNS positively correlated with ASC symptomatology. However, 
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which brain regions are incorporated into each network varies amongst reports: Fishman et 
al. (2014) included the IFG and MTG in the Theory of Mind network (TOMn) rather than the 
MNS, which may explain why only TOMn differences were reported in less severe ASC 
cases. When focusing on the individual brain regions rather than purported networks, 
participants who demonstrate strongest symptomatology showed enhanced functional 
connectivity between the IFG, MTG and mPFC. Fishman et al. (2014) also report enhanced 
connectivity between the TOMn and MNS: this could fit with the STORM model to suggest 
that unusual connections from the theory of mind network to the MNS lead to problems with 
top-down control, particularly affecting the M-route. 
 
Given potential functional connectivity differences, investigating the white matter 
connections within the MNS may provide more insight into the abnormalities associated 
with ASC. Three studies using Diffusion Tensor Imaging (DTI), or more recent Diffusion 
Spectrum Imaging (DSI), were identified; Schaer et al. (2013), Chien et al. (2015), and 
Fründt et al., (2018). Schaer et al. (2013) did not aim to specifically test the connectivity 
between mirror neuron regions: they do report reduced gyrification in the IFG (and IPL), and 
make the note that this area has been implicated in MN theories and that this reduced 
gyrification could indicate early developmental abnormalities, but this interpretation is made 
post-hoc. Chien et al. (2015) and Fründt et al. (2018) failed to find group differences in MNS 
connectivity, findings which are problematic for the BMH and the EP-M model. A lack of 
group differences in MNS structure may suggest that atypicilaties lie outside of this system, 
as per the STORM model. Furthermore, Fründt et al. (2018) found no evidence for a fronto-
temporal MNS tract in ASC or NT groups. This queries the existence of the M-pathway and 
the validity of the EP-0PRGHO+RZHYHULWVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDW+DPLOWRQ¶VUHYLHZ
considers DTI evidence to support the existence of an M-pathway. Furthermore, other recent 
studies not specifically examining structures in the context of mirror neuron and related 
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theories have reported connections between the IFG and MTG: Briggs et al (2019) report 
that these regions are connected via the superior longitudinal fasciculus. 
 
In summary, imaging techniques demonstrate that MNS activity and functional 
connectivity differs between ASC and NT individuals, although the direction of group 
differences is often contrary to expectations. In particular, the IFG is reported across 
different studies as having different activity, different functional connectivity, and different 
structural properties, in ASC. This would suggest a dysfunction as proposed by both the 
BMH and EP-M. However, DTI studies fail to show structural connectivity differences 
between participant groups within the MNS itself, and thus atypicalities may be the result of 
reduced top-down modulation, as argued by STORM. 
 
 
Evidence from Near Infrared Spectroscopy studies 
 
Since Near Infrared Spectroscopy (NIRS) measures neural activity via oxy-
haemoglobin levels, similar to fMRI, predictions from each model are identical to those 
PDGHDERXW05,UHVHDUFK$WWKHWLPHRI+DPLOWRQ¶VUHYLHZQR1,56VWXGLHVKDG
been conducted. We identified 1 NIRS study investigating MNS function in ASC. 
 
Mori et al. (2015) reported reduced IFG oxy-haemoglobin levels in ASC individuals 
compared to NT controls. This is intriguing given the hyperactivity reported in this region by 
Libero et al. (2014) and Wadsworth et al. (2018), using fMRI. Both methods essentially 
index blood-oxygen concentration levels, and typically correlate in concurrent fMRI-fNIRS 
studies (e.g. see Cui, Signe, Bryant, Glover, & Reiss, 2011). The participants used by Mori et 
al (2015) had lower IQ scores than those of the fMRI studies (though IQ scores were still 70 
and above, indicting no intellectual disability). It is unclear whether this could account for 
differences in levels of IFG activity; the recent meta-analysis by Yang and Hofmann (2016) 
of fMRI data also only included studies with participants with IQs within the normal range, 
  
CONTINUING TO LOOK IN THE MIRROR 
 
 
18 
thus is appears there is limited data to suggest whether lower IQs in autism pattern with 
underactivity of the IFG, as opposed to hyperactivity seen in autistic participants with higher 
IQs. Mori et al. (2015) also reported that activity in the IFG increased after the children with 
autism were taught to imitate facial expressions, however the control group did not undergo 
this training, so relative increases in this area could not be examined. 
 
Broadly these findings support the BMH, in that the IFG, a key MNS area is 
underactive, but training targeting behaviours that utilise the MNS can normalise the 
activity of the IFG. The involvement of the IFG, and its increase in activity after training of 
facial imitation ± a form of imitation argued to rely particularly on the M-route ± would also 
fit with the EP-M model. 
 
Evidence from post-mortem studies 
 
For the data reviewed thus far, the resolution limitations of neuroimaging prevent 
discovering whether group differences in MNS activation are due to atypicality in mirror 
neurons themselves. Here post-mortem studies may be able to shed light on differences at 
the cellular level. The BMH would predict difference in the IFG and IPL, the EP-M would 
predict differences in the IFG and MTG, the STORM model would predict differences in 
frontal brain regions. Hamilton (2008, 2013) did not include post-mortem studies, but our 
search revealed one study of relevance; Jacot-Descombes et al. (2012). 
 
This study measured neuronal differences within the IFG in eight post-mortem brains 
from ASC individuals and two NT brains. It was reported that ASC brains had reduced 
neuron size but equal neuronal frequency and layer volume within the IFG. Since all models 
would predict some form of neuronal difference within this area, affecting either the top-
down pathways to the MNS (STORM model) or the efficiency of the M-pathway or entire 
MNS (EP-M model and BMH respectfully), such limited investigation cannot differentiate 
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between the models in question. However, this reduction in neuron size could be responsible 
for the reduced connectivity between the IFG and PFC, shown in DTI studies. Neural tissue 
from individuals as young as 4-years-old were incorporated, suggesting neural differences 
being present from early life. Therefore, such findings can add to evidence supporting BMH, 
EP-M and STORM accounts. However, there is no way of confirming whether these neurons 
had mirror properties. 
 
Evidence from neurofeedback training 
 
Neurofeedback training (NFT) evidence with regard to the BMH argues that, assuming 
the BMH is valid, normalizing MNS activity using NFT techniques should reduce ASC 
symptoms. In addition to its potential clinical uses, NFT could also provide an important 
experimental paradigm to acquire causal, rather than correlational, evidence regarding the 
role of the MNS in autistic symptomatology. NFT studies examining MNS function to date 
have relied on EEG measures of the MNS, in which children watch a film or play a game 
which is linked to EEG recordings of mu rhythms. The child must periodically decrease their 
mu rhythm (i.e. engage in MNS activity, as indexed by mu suppression) to continue the film 
or game while simultaneously ensuring that theta and beta activity (associated with 
distraction) remains below a threshold. If a deficit in the MNS is a cause of ASC 
symptomatology, as the BMH and EP-M models suggest, training based on MNS activity 
should reduce ASC symptoms (the EP-M model would specify that training M-route based 
processes should be what supports a reduction in ASC symptoms). The STORM model 
would suggest that simply normalizing activity will not help reduce autistic symptoms, 
rather training ought to consider the appropriate modulation of mirroring processes. 
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Studies into the effectiveness of NFT (Pineda et al., 2014; Pineda et al., 2008; Datko et 
al., 2018) claim to show such findings. Furthermore, by combining NFT with fMRI, Datko et 
al. (2018) reported that NFT increased activity within the MNS in ASC participants. 
 
Intriguingly, NFT may have disadvantageous effects on NT participants, including 
reduced social communication scores (Pineda et al., 2014) and reduced MNS activity 
measured by fMRI (Datko et al. 2018). It is possible that the disadvantageous effects of 
NFT on NT individuals result from the MNS becoming hyper-activate during NFT, 
comparable to the hyper-activity seen in ASC participants in some fMRI studies (e.g. 
Libero et al., 2014; Wadsworth et al., 2018). However, such findings do not rule out that 
changes in MNS activity may be due to punishing attentional laps, and therefore 
improving top-down control to the MNS, as expressed by the STORM model. 
 
The NFT literature at present faces several methodological issues. Neither Pineda et al. 
(2014) or Datko et al. (2018) used a placebo NFT condition with ASC participants, and both 
studies relied on parental reports to measure behavioural improvements. This is clearly not a 
blind test, opening the possibility that parental expectations about the effectiveness of NFT 
confounded the improvements seen in the ASC group. This is especially worrisome given 
WKHVWDWHGPRWLYDWLRQVIRUSDUHQWVWRSDUWLFLSDWHLQWKHVWXG\³3DUHQWVDQGFKLOGUHQZLWK$6'
were primarily motivated by the expectation that the training would produce differences in 
EHKDYLRXU´3LQHGDHWDOS 
 
Only Pindea et al. (2008) incorporated an ASC placebo group and a double-blind 
protocol. The study reported that NFT did improve behavioural measures only in the 
experimental group, however these improvements were limited to attention and not ASC 
specific symptoms. This increases the likelihood that improvements in ASC 
symptomatology are linked to increased prefrontal control (Kane & Engle, 2002), caused by 
punishing attentional shifts. Therefore, results are perhaps better explained by the STORM 
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model or possibly a general attentional model (e.g. Chun et al., 2011) rather than the BMH. 
Furthermore, these paradigms may have failed to improve other symptoms (e.g. deficits in 
social interaction) because children were taught to modulate via explicit input (e.g. the film 
stopping and starting). Arguably this does not represent the cues used, according to the 
STORM model, to modulate mirroring activity usually: perhaps if social cues were used, as 
suggested by the STORM model, improvements in social and communication may be seen. 
 
To summarise, the NFT literature contains methodological flaws, and the most 
prominent study in the literature only shows improvements in attention which could be 
better explained by the STORM model. 
 
Discussion 
 
The BMH has been a highly influential (if controversial) theory regarding autism, and it 
is evident that this theory and the counter-hypotheses that came after it continue to inform 
neuroscientific research in autism. Consistent with previous reviews, this review found 
largely a lack of evidence for the BMH. The EP-M model received some support from EEG, 
TMS and fMRI evidence. Some DTI evidence included in this review cast some doubt over 
the validity of this model, given that lack of a neuroanatomical connection between the brain 
region comprising the M-pathway, although such a pathway has been identified in non-MNS 
related research. The STORM model also received some support, particularly from EEG/NFT 
data, and (unlike the EP-M model) is not dependent upon the existence of an M-pathway. As 
noted by Hamilton (2008), these two models are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and 
selective problems with M-route related processes could be caused by problems with top-
down modulation. Indeed, this is perhaps the best way to reconcile the evidence as both the 
majority of STORM and EP-M predictions are supported. 
 
Future researchers should consider investigating the nature of top-down modulation in 
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ASC, possibly implemented by the PFC, as opposed to just examining the MNS itself. The 
 
PFC has been implicated in allocating the contextual goal behind a task (Mante et al. 2013; 
 
Blakemore & Decety, 2001; Erlhagen et al., 2006) and has been linked to action inhibition 
 
(Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Swick et al., 2008) in NT participants. However, the exact nature 
 
of the top-down regulation required remains unclear. A possible candidate could be a process 
 
referred to as self-other control, in which the activity of neural representations referring to 
 
self-executed actions and representations stimulated by the actions of others are modulated 
 
depending on the social situation (de Guzman, Bird, Banissy, & Catmur, 2016; Sowden & 
 
Shah, 2014). For example, individuals must reduce their own internal state and enhance 
QHXUDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVH[WHUQDOO\GULYHQE\DQRWKHU¶VHPRWLRQDOVWDWHZKHQHPSDWKLVLQJZLWK
an individual. In contrast, one must inhibit motor representations stimulated by observed 
actions and increase internally driven motor representations to prevent imitation of another 
SHUVRQ¶VDFWLRQV7UDLQLQJVHOI-other control in the motor domain has been shown to improve 
empathy scores (de Guzman et al. 2016) and perspective taking (Santiesteban et al., 2012), 
the latter being a specific effect to imitation-inhibition training, as general inhibition training 
had no effect. This suggests that self-other control could be a general mechanism behind a 
variety of social cognitive abilities (e.g. imitation, theory of mind, empathy etc.). Since self-
other control has been consistently linked to mPFC and TPJ activity (Brass et al. 2001, 2005, 
2009; Liepelt et al. 2016; Sowden and Shah, 2014) the reduced self-other control seen in 
ASC (Spengler et al. 2010; Sowden and Shah, 2014) mirrors the lack of top-down regulation 
proposed by the STORM model. 
 
A strength of the STORM account is that it is not dependent upon the existence of the 
MNS itself. Even though Hamilton incorporated the MNS within the model, the model is 
mainly discussed in terms of a basic visual-motor mapping system, consisting of the 
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inferior parietal cortex, premotor cortex and primary motor cortex. Therefore, evidence 
which contradicts the existence of a human MNS (e.g. Lingnau et al., 2009, Fründt et al., 
ZRXOGQRWSRVHDQLVVXHWRWKHPRGHO¶VYDOLGLW\DVWKHPRGHOIRFXVHVRQWKHWRS-
down regulation of a visual-motor system via social cues, rather than the nature of how 
visual-motor mapping is achieved. This is not the case for the BMH or EP-M model, which 
both specifically require the existence of the MNS in humans. 
 ,WLVSRVVLEOHWKDWGLVFUHSDQWILQGLQJVPD\EHH[SODLQHGE\IDFWRUVVXFKDVSDUWLFLSDQWV¶
age and IQ levels. With regards to how age and gender bears upon our analysis of these 
studies, we see no particular pattern with age: results that refute the BMH occur across 
studies with different ages of participants and different proportions of males and females. 
For IQ, at least for the studies that included details regarding the IQ of their samples, it appears 
that these studies largely only included participants without intellectual disability (i.e. IQ>70). 
Thus, it must be borne in mind that the results reported in these studies, and thus the conclusions 
of our review are restricted to autistic people without intellectual disabilities. 
 
In conclusion, this review extends the current ASC literature by specifically 
contrasting the BMH, EP-M and STORM model against each other, based on recent 
neuroscientific evidence. Evidence contradicts predictions made by the BMH, and favours 
an integrated account of the EP-M and STORM models. Future investigations should focus 
on top-down modulation, rather than simple MNS dysfunctions in ASC. Such investigations 
should use mentalizing or facial imitation tasks which may be more sensitive to the detecting 
specific processes important to the STORM model (e.g. regulation via social cues) than often 
used hand observation tasks. Furthermore, we suggest shifting away from looking for 
dysfunction in isolated MNS areas, in favour of examining how networks regulate multiple 
systems, which contribute to social processes in both NT and ASC populations. 
 
  
CONTINUING TO LOOK IN THE MIRROR 
 
 
24 
 
References 
 
Bernier, R., Aaronson, B., & McPartland, J. (2013). The role of imitation in the 
observed heterogeneity in EEG mu rhythm in autism and typical development. Brain 
and cognition, 82(1), 69-75. 
 
Blakemore, S. J., & Decety, J. (2001). From the perception of action to the understanding 
of intention. Nature reviews neuroscience, 2(8), 561. 
 
Boria, S., Fabbri-Destro, M., Cattaneo, L., Sparaci, L., Sinigaglia, C., Santelli, E., ... 
& Rizzolatti, G. (2009). Intention understanding in autism. PloS one, 4(5), e5596. 
Braadbaart, L., Williams, J. H., & Waiter, G. D. (2013). Do mirror neuron areas mediate 
mu rhythm suppression during imitation and action observation? International Journal 
of Psychophysiology, 89(1), 99-105. 
 
Brass, M., Bekkering, H., & Prinz, W. (2001). Movement observation affects 
movement execution in a simple response task. Acta psychologica, 106(1-2), 3-22. 
 
Brass, M., Derrfuss, J., & von Cramon, D. Y. (2005). The inhibition of imitative and 
overlearned responses: a functional double dissociation. Neuropsychologia, 43(1), 89-
98. 
 
Brass, M., Ruby, P., & Spengler, S. (2009). Inhibition of imitative behaviour and 
social cognition. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological 
Sciences, 364(1528), 2359-2367. 
 
Buccino, G., Binkofski, F., & Riggio, L. (2004). The mirror neuron system and 
action recognition. Brain and language, 89(2), 370-376. 
 
Cattaneo, L., Fabbri-Destro, M., Boria, S., Pieraccini, C., Monti, A., Cossu, G., & 
Rizzolatti, G. (2007). Impairment of actions chains in autism and its possible role in 
  
CONTINUING TO LOOK IN THE MIRROR 
 
 
25 
intention understanding. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104(45), 
17825-17830. 
 
Cheyne, D., Gaetz, W., Garnero, L., Lachaux, J. P., Ducorps, A., Schwartz, D., & Varela, 
F. J. (2003). Neuromagnetic imaging of cortical oscillations accompanying tactile 
stimulation. Cognitive brain research, 17(3), 599-611. 
 
Chien, H. Y., Gau, S. S. F., Hsu, Y. C., Chen, Y. J., Lo, Y. C., Shih, Y. C., & Tseng, W. Y. 
I. (2015). Altered cortical thickness and tract integrity of the mirror neuron system and 
associated social communication in autism spectrum disorder. Autism research, 8(6), 694-
708. 
 
Chun, M. M., Golomb, J. D., & Turk-Browne, N. B. (2011). A taxonomy of external 
and internal attention. Annual review of psychology, 62, 73-101. 
Cole, E. J., Barraclough, N. E., & Enticott, P. G. (2018). Investigating Mirror System 
(MS) 㻭㼏㼠㼕㼢㼕㼠㼥㻌㼕㼚㻌㻭㼐㼡㼘㼠㼟㻌㼣㼕㼠㼔㻌㻭㻿㻰㻌㼃㼔㼑㼚㻌㻵㼚㼒㼑㼞㼞㼕㼚㼓㻌㻻㼠㼔㼑㼞㼟䇻㻌㻵㼚㼠㼑㼚㼠㼕㼛㼚㼟㻌㼁㼟㼕㼚㼓㻌㻮㼛㼠㼔 
TMS and EEG. Journal of autism and developmental disorders, 48(7), 2350-2367. 
 
Confalonieri, L., Pagnoni, G., Barsalou, L. W., Rajendra, J., Eickhoff, S. B., & Butler, A. 
J. (2012). Brain activation in primary motor and somatosensory cortices during motor 
imagery correlates with motor imagery ability in stroke patients. ISRN neurology, 2012. 
 
Cui, X., Bray, S., Bryant, D. M., Glover, G. H., & Reiss, A. L. (2011). A quantitative 
comparison of NIRS and fMRI across multiple cognitive tasks. Neuroimage, 54(4), 
2808-282 
 
Dapretto, M., Davies, M. S., Pfeifer, J. H., Scott, A. A., Sigman, M., Bookheimer, S. Y., 
& Iacoboni, M. (2006). Understanding emotions in others: mirror neuron dysfunction 
in children with autism spectrum disorders. Nature neuroscience, 9(1), 28-30. 
 
  
CONTINUING TO LOOK IN THE MIRROR 
 
 
26 
Datko, M., Pineda, J. A., & Müller, R. A. (2018). Positive effects of neurofeedback on 
autism symptoms correlate with brain activation during imitation and observation. 
European Journal of Neuroscience, 47(6), 579-591. 
 
de Guzman, M., Bird, G., Banissy, M. J., & Catmur, C. (2016). Self䇵other control 
processes in social cognition: from imitation to empathy. Philosophical Transactions of 
the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 371(1686), 20150079. 
 
Di Pellegrino, G., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., Gallese, V., & Rizzolatti, G. (1992). 
Understanding motor events: a neurophysiological study. Experimental brain research, 
91(1), 176-180. 
 
Dumas, G., Soussignan, R., Hugueville, L., Martinerie, J., & Nadel, J. (2014). Revisiting 
mu suppression in autism spectrum disorder. Brain research, 1585, 108-119. 
 
Edwards, L. A. (2014). A meta䇲analysis of imitation abilities in individuals with 
autism spectrum disorders. Autism Research, 7(3), 363-380. 
 
Enticott, P., Kennedy, H., Rinehart, N. J., Bradshaw, J., Tonge, B., Daskalakis, Z. J., 
& Fitzgerald, P. (2013A. Frontiers in human neuroscience, 7, 218. 
 
Erlhagen, W., Mukovskiy, A., & Bicho, E. (2006). A dynamic model for action 
understanding and goal-directed imitation. Brain research, 1083(1), 174-188. 
 
Fadiga, L., Craighero, L., & Olivier, E. (2005). Human motor cortex excitability during 
WKHSHUFHSWLRQRIRWKHUV¶DFWLRQCurrent opinion in neurobiology, 15(2), 213-218. 
 
Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., Pavesi, G., & Rizzolatti, G. (1995). Motor facilitation during action 
observation: a magnetic stimulation study. Journal of neurophysiology, 73(6), 2608-
2611. 
 
Fan, Y. T., Decety, J., Yang, C. Y., Liu, J. L., & Cheng, Y. (2010). Unbroken mirror 
neurons in autism spectrum disorders. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 
51(9), 981-988. 
  
CONTINUING TO LOOK IN THE MIRROR 
 
 
27 
 
Fishman, I., Keown, C. L., Lincoln, A. J., Pineda, J. A., & Müller, R. A. (2014). 
Atypical cross talk between mentalizing and mirror neuron networks in autism 
spectrum disorder. JAMA psychiatry, 71(7), 751-760. 
 
Frenkel-Toledo, S., Bentin, S., Perry, A., Liebermann, D. G., & Soroker, N. (2014). Mirror- 
 
neuron system recruitment by action observation: effects of focal brain damage on 
mu suppression. NeuroImage, 87, 127-137. 
 
Fründt, O., Schulz, R., Schöttle, D., Cheng, B., Thomalla, G., Braaß, H., ... & Bäumer, T. 
(2018). White Matter Microstructure of the Human Mirror Neuron System is Related 
to Symptom Severity in Adults with Autism. Journal of autism and developmental 
disorders, 48(2), 417-429. 
 
Hamilton, A. F. D. C. (2008). Emulation and mimicry for social interaction: a 
theoretical approach to imitation in autism. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 61(1), 101-115. 
Hamilton, A. F. D. C. (2013). Reflecting on the mirror neuron system in autism: a 
systematic review of current theories. Developmental cognitive neuroscience, 3, 91-105. 
 
Hickok, G. (2009). Eight problems for the mirror neuron theory of action understanding 
in monkeys and humans. Journal of cognitive neuroscience, 21(7), 1229-1243. 
 
Hobson, H. M., & Bishop, D. V. (2016). Mu suppression±a good measure of the 
human mirror neuron system?. Cortex, 82, 290-310. 
 
Hobson, H., & Bishop, D. (2017) Reply to Bowman et al: Building the foundations 
for moving mu suppression research forward. Cortex, 96. 
 
Hobson, H. M., & Bishop, D. V. (2017). The interpretation of mu suppression as an index of 
mirror neuron activity: past, present and future. Royal Society Open Science, 4(3), 
160662. 
 
  
CONTINUING TO LOOK IN THE MIRROR 
 
 
28 
Jacot-Descombes, S., Uppal, N., Wicinski, B., Santos, M., Schmeidler, J., Giannakopoulos, 
P., ... & Hof, P. R. (2012). Decreased pyramidal neuron size in Brodmann areas 44 and 
45 in patients with autism. Acta neuropathologica, 124(1), 67-79. 
 
Kane, M. J., & Engle, R. W. (2002). The role of prefrontal cortex in working-memory 
capacity, executive attention, and general fluid intelligence: An individual-
differences perspective. Psychonomic bulletin & review, 9(4), 637-671. 
 
Libero, L. E., Maximo, J. O., Deshpande, H. D., Klinger, L. G., Klinger, M. R., & Kana, R. 
K. (2014). The role of mirroring and mentalizing networks in mediating action intentions 
in autism. Molecular autism, 5(1), 50. 
 
Liepelt, R., Klempova, B., Dolk, T., Colzato, L. S., Ragert, P., Nitsche, M. A., & Hommel, 
B. (2016). The medial frontal cortex mediates self-other discrimination in the joint Simon 
task. Journal of Psychophysiology. 
 
Lingnau, A., Gesierich, B., & Caramazza, A. (2009). Asymmetric fMRI adaptation reveals 
no evidence for mirror neurons in humans. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 106(24), 9925-9930. 
Mante, V., Sussillo, D., Shenoy, K. V., & Newsome, W. T. (2013). Context-
dependent computation by recurrent dynamics in prefrontal cortex. nature, 
503(7474), 78. 
 
Martineau, J., Andersson, F., Barthélémy, C., Cottier, J. P., & Destrieux, C. (2010). Atypical 
activation of the mirror neuron system during perception of hand motion in autism. Brain 
research, 1320, 168-175. 
 
Mathewson, K. J., Jetha, M. K., Drmic, I. E., Bryson, S. E., Goldberg, J. O., & Schmidt, L. A. 
(2012). Regional EEG alpha power, coherence, and behavioral symptomatology in autism 
spectrum disorder. Clinical Neurophysiology, 123(9), 1798-1809. 
 
  
CONTINUING TO LOOK IN THE MIRROR 
 
 
29 
Mori, K., Toda, Y., Ito, H., Mori, T., Mori, K., Goji, A., ... & Kagami, S. (2015). 
Neuroimaging in autism spectrum disorders: 1H-MRS and NIRS study. The Journal 
of Medical Investigation, 62(1.2), 29-36. 
 
Oberman, L. M., & Ramachandran, V. S. (2007). The simulating social mind: the role of 
the mirror neuron system and simulation in the social and communicative deficits of 
autism spectrum disorders. Psychological bulletin, 133(2), 310. 
 
Oberman, L. M., McCleery, J. P., Hubbard, E. M., Bernier, R., Wiersema, J. R., 
Raymaekers, R., & Pineda, J. A. (2013). Developmental changes in mu suppression to 
observed and executed actions in autism spectrum disorders. Social cognitive and 
affective neuroscience, 8(3), 300-304. 
 
Pineda, J. A., Brang, D., Hecht, E., Edwards, L., Carey, S., Bacon, M., ... & Rork, A. (2008). 
Positive behavioral and electrophysiological changes following neurofeedback training in 
children with autism. Research in Autism Spectrum Disorders, 2(3), 557-581. 
 
Pineda, J. A., Carrasco, K., Datko, M., Pillen, S., & Schalles, M. (2014). Neurofeedback 
training produces normalization in behavioural and electrophysiological measures of 
high-functioning autism. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B, 369(1644), 20130183. 
 
Ramachandran, V. S., & Oberman, L. M. (2006). Broken mirrors: a theory 
of autism. Scientific American, 295(5), 62-69. 
 
Ridderinkhof, K. R., Van Den Wildenberg, W. P., Segalowitz, S. J., & Carter, C. S. (2004). 
Neurocognitive mechanisms of cognitive control: the role of prefrontal cortex in action 
selection, response inhibition, performance monitoring, and reward-based learning. 
Brain and cognition, 56(2), 129-140. 
 
  
CONTINUING TO LOOK IN THE MIRROR 
 
 
30 
Rizzolatti, G. (2009). Intention understanding in autism. PloS one, 4(5), e5596. 
Ruysschaert, L., Warreyn, P., Wiersema, J. R., Oostra, A., & Roeyers, H. (2014). 
Exploring 
 
the role of neural mirroring in children with autism spectrum disorder. 
Autism Research, 7(2), 197-206. 
 
Santiesteban, I., White, S., Cook, J., Gilbert, S. J., Heyes, C., & Bird, G. (2012). Training 
social cognition: from imitation to theory of mind. Cognition, 122(2), 228-235. 
 
Schaer, M., Ottet, M. C., Scariati, E., Dukes, D., Franchini, M., Eliez, S., & Glaser, B. 
(2013). Decreased frontal gyrification correlates with altered connectivity in children 
with autism. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7, 750. 
 
Sowden, S., & Shah, P. (2014). Self-other control: a candidate mechanism for 
social cognitive function. Frontiers in human neuroscience, 8, 789. 
 
Spengler, S., Bird, G., & Brass, M. (2010). Hyperimitation of actions is related to 
reduced understanding of others' minds in autism spectrum conditions. Biological 
psychiatry, 68(12), 1148-1155. 
 
Swick, D., Ashley, V., & Turken, U. (2008). Left inferior frontal gyrus is critical for 
response inhibition. BMC neuroscience, 9(1), 102. 
 
Vivanti, G., McCormick, C., Young, G. S., Abucayan, F., Hatt, N., Nadig, A., ... & 
Rogers, S. J. (2011). Intact and impaired mechanisms of action understanding in 
 
autism. Developmental psychology, 47(3), 841. 
 
 
Wadsworth, H. M., Maximo, J. O., Donnelly, R. J., & Kana, R. K. (2018). Action 
simulation and mirroring in children with autism spectrum disorders. Behavioural brain 
 
research, 341, 1-8. 
 
  
CONTINUING TO LOOK IN THE MIRROR 
 
 
31 
Wang, Y., & Hamilton, A. F. D. C. (2012). Social top-down response modulation 
(STORM): a model of the control of mimicry in social interaction. Frontiers in human 
neuroscience, 6, 153. 
 
Williams, J. H., Waiter, G. D., Gilchrist, A., Perrett, D. I., Murray, A. D., & Whiten, 
$1HXUDOPHFKDQLVPVRILPLWDWLRQDQGµPLUURUQHXURQ¶IXQFWLRQLQJLQ
autistic spectrum disorder. Neuropsychologia, 44(4), 610-621. 
 
Yang, J., & Hofmann, J. (2016). Action observation and imitation in autism spectrum 
disorders: an ALE meta-analysis of fMRI studies. Brain imaging and behavior, 
10(4), 960-969. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
CONTINUING TO LOOK IN THE MIRROR 
 
 
32 
  
  
CONTINUING TO LOOK IN THE MIRROR 
 
 
33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
CONTINUING TO LOOK IN THE MIRROR 
 
 
34 
 
  
CONTINUING TO LOOK IN THE MIRROR 
 
 
35 
  
  
CONTINUING TO LOOK IN THE MIRROR 
 
 
36 
 
  
CONTINUING TO LOOK IN THE MIRROR 
 
 
37 
  
  
CONTINUING TO LOOK IN THE MIRROR 
 
 
38 
 
  
CONTINUING TO LOOK IN THE MIRROR 
 
 
39 
  
  
CONTINUING TO LOOK IN THE MIRROR 
 
 
40 
 
 
 
 
 
A 
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Figure 1- Nodes of the Mirror Neuron System (MNS) and areas of top down control as included in the Social Top-
Down Response Modulation (STORM) model, EP-M model and Broken Mirror Hypothesis (BMH) of Autism 
Spectrum Condition. Crosses indicate suggested locations of abnormality/dysfunction proposed by different models. 
Panel A includes all regions and pathways across the three models. Panel B represents global dysfunction of the 
Mirror Neuron System (MNS) stated by the BMH. Panel C demonstrates dysfunction to the Mimicry Pathway (M) 
but no dysfunction to the planning (P) or Emulation (E) pathway of the MNS, proposed by the EP-M model.  Panel D 
represent how top down dysfunction could disrupt appropriate MNS functioning as suggested by the STORM model. 
PFC = Prefrontal cortex; IFG = Inferior frontal gyrus; IPL = Inferior parietal lobe; MTG = Middle temporal gyrus. 
